This paper considers some of the economic impacts that demographic change may have in developed economies over the next fifty years. I focus on the role that financial markets might play in economies where the pressure on government-run unfunded pension systems is likely to rise. The role of unfunded schemes is considered in a world where financial markets are incomplete and important types of risk cannot easily be offset by trading. How demographic shifts might affect labour productivity, asset prices and aggregate output is investigated using a simulation model of an economy where population structure is changing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mine is a rather dry title for an Inaugural Lecture. I could have called it 'Death, Sex and Money' which would have been fairly accurate as a description of the interrelated forces that I will analyse; and such a title might appeal to a large audience. I do not know what proportion of people's conscious lives is spent thinking about death, sex or money but I suspect the answer is high; the relative time allocated to each is almost certainly a highly non-linear function of age. I want to talk about some of the economic impacts of demographic change and to focus particularly on the role of financial markets in economies where ageing is rapid. I shall argue that demographic changes are likely to have significant effects on many parts of the economy. Quantifying these effects and thinking about appropriate public policy responses is difficult. Unfortunately, there are no simple answers, but understanding why this is so is itself useful. The reason why analysing the effects of demographic change upon economies in general, and upon financial markets in particular, is so difficult is that shifts in the structure of the population have so many different potential impacts upon economies; some of these effects are self-reinforcing and some offsetting. But I think economists can say useful things about many of these forces and about the advantages and drawbacks of various responses to them.
One thing we can be fairly certain of is that, in nearly all developed economies over the course of the next fifty years, there will be a substantial increase in the proportion of the population of age over 65 and a substantial decrease in the proportion of the population aged under 30. Leon Trotsky, in exile in Mexico in the late 1930s, wrote in his diary: 'Old age is the most unexpected of all things that happen to a man'. There are two reasons why Trotsky was profoundly wrong here. First, demographers and actuaries are rather good at predicting the odds of living for another twenty or thirty years conditional on current age. And even economists can work out how old someone who survives for the next twenty years will then be. (The second reason Trotsky was wrong is that something far more unexpected than gradually ageing was about to happen to him which involved an ice axe.) So economists and demographers can be fairly confident about trends in demographic structure, at least over a horizon of up to fifty years when unexpected shifts in fertility are not likely to have a big impact upon the age profile. But there is much less certainty about the economic impact of demographic change. Such changes may have significant impacts in all of the following areas:
• The stock of wealth, the rate of saving and also the capital stock used in domestic production may all be significantly affected by shifts in the relative numbers of those at different points in their life cycle. The sizes of the impacts depend on the profile of wealth accumulation over the life cycle, and the effects on domestic production will reflect the degree of cross-border mobility of capital.
• The level and composition of public spending, the structure of taxes and also the degree of risk-sharing through government programmes are likely to be affected by demographic change.
• Real wages, labour-force participation rates and the structure of earnings over typical working lives may be affected by demographic change. Key factors here are the relation between age and productivity, the substitutability of workers of different ages and the evolution of the capital-labour ratio.
• The relative resources of different generations alive at the same time will be affected by the relative size of those generations.
• The resources of a given generation over its life are also likely to be affected by shifts in population structure.
• The structure of private sector portfolios of wealth, and therefore relative asset prices, are likely to be influenced by the age structure of the population.
• And there are eventually likely to be feedbacks from all of the above to fertility and longevity.
This last point is particularly relevant in thinking about the very long-term structure of populations. I think one indication of the importance of feedbacks from the structure of economies to the structure of populations is the dramatic decline in fertility over the post-war period in many industrialised countries. Forty years ago, the fertility rate (the average number of children born per woman) in Italy was around 2.5; the replacement rate of fertility (which would keep the population constant) was about 2.1. The fertility rate now is around half this level (1.2 in 1994). As a matter of fact, over this period, the generosity of Italian state pensions has increased sharply. It is, of course, nearly always a mistake in economics to draw strong causal inferences from correlations of this sort. Yet it strikes me as plausible that the rise in the role of the state as pension provider in western economies may well have been an important factor behind the reduction in the numbers of children that households have; the insurance role of children in providing resources for old age, which remains a potent factor in many lessdeveloped countries, has obviously become much less important in Europe. (It is interesting to speculate on the possibly unstable dynamics that such a process can generate as declining fertility rates increase the tax burden on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) state pension schemes.)
All the possible effects of shifts in demographic structure noted above depend upon each other in rather complex ways -one cannot think about the impact on financial markets of ageing without thinking about how such changes affect everything else on the list above. But it is obviously not very helpful to simply say 'Oh dear ... it's all very complex'.
If economic theory has a use, and I think it does, it is precisely in trying to untangle the complex interactions between forces; this is what general equilibrium theory is for. I want to use some very simple general equilibrium models to try to say something on the role of financial markets in economies where ageing is rapid and to analyse what financial markets can and cannot do in handling the distributional problems that ageing throws up. I also want to think about the impact of ageing upon asset prices and see who the 'winners' and 'losers' might be. Finally, I want to pose some problems for economists and highlight areas where we need answers fast.
In order to think about the future, we need to know where we start from -in terms of current population patterns, financial structures and pension arrangements -and what the demographic shifts might look like. In the next section, I briefly review the evidence. Figure 1 shows the United Nations projection of the relative numbers of people in different age-groups within Europe over the next sixty years. The graph shows that there is a steady and substantial decline in those aged under 30 for most of the next twenty years. Over this period, there is a gradual increase in the proportion of the population over 65; this increase accelerates rather sharply from the end of the first decade until about 2040. In the period up to 2020, there is also a significant increase in the proportion of those in the second half of their working lives within most European countries. (This is particularly important for analysing likely trends in the private sector savings rate within Europe.) An indication of the pressure that these demographic changes will have upon public finances, and particularly upon the cost of state-run pension schemes, is given by trends in the support ratio -the ratio of the number of people of working age to the number aged over 65. Figures 2-5 show United Nations projections of support ratios for the four major European countries. In the UK, there is little decline in the support ratio until the second decade of the next century; but by 2040, the support ratio has fallen from its current level of a little under 4 to well under 3. In the major continental European countries, the pace of ageing of the population is substantially more rapid. In France, the support ratio falls from 4 to 2 by 2030. In Italy and Germany, the increase in the relative numbers of those of retirement age is even more dramatic. It is now well understood that these demographic changes will mean that state pension schemes will come under increasing pressure over the next few decades. If there were to be no increase in the contribution rates to fund the PAYG state schemes of the major European countries, and no change in the generosity of pensions paid, then in almost all cases substantial deficits will be generated through the course of the first half of the next century. The UK and Ireland are exceptions here. Figure 6 shows how substantial those deficits might be. If we assume that the generosity of state pensions is preserved at its current level, that there is no increase in contribution rates and that state retirement ages increase no more rapidly than is implied by current legislation, we can calculate the likely net present value of the accumulated deficits over the course of the next seventy-five years. Figure 6 shows how large those net present values are for European countries when expressed as a 1994 pound sterling equivalent per person. (The projections are based on OECD simulations reported at length in Roseveare et al. (1996) .) In Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands, the per person burden of future deficits is around £20,000. In Italy, the situation is slightly worse. In Germany, the deficit is closer to £30,000, and in France, it is slightly higher again. Sweden and Belgium are in a yet worse position, while the present value of the per capita deficit in Denmark may be in excess of £80,000.
II. AGEING, WEALTH AND PENSIONS IN INDUSTRIALISED ECONOMIES
These figures should not be taken as predictions as to how rapid the rise in public sector deficits will be, since it is unlikely that European governments could allow deficit financing on this scale to occur. Rather, they are an indication of the scale of cut-backs in pension expenditure, or of rises in taxes, that need to occur. The relatively favourable position of the UK and Ireland is due partly to the less rapid ageing of the population over the next fifty years in those countries. But it is mainly a reflection of the lower level of state pension benefits already being paid and, in the case of the UK, of the steady decline in the ratio of basic state pension to average earnings that will arise if indexation of pensions to retail prices (rather than earnings) continues. Source: Based on OECD simulations reported in Roseveare et al. (1996) .
The diversity within Europe of the generosity of state pension schemes and in the seriousness of the impact of ageing upon government expenditure is matched by the diversity of asset holdings of the personal sectors. In assessing the likely impact of demographic changes upon savings, asset allocations and asset prices, it is useful to look at the current stocks of wealth held in different countries and at the distribution of that wealth across assets. The stock of wealth, relative to GDP, in the major economies is surprisingly uniform. In the US, the UK, Japan, France, Germany and Italy, most estimates of the stock of total national wealth to annual GDP are somewhere between 5 and 6. But there is very substantial variation in the allocation of the wealth of the personal sector across different assets. That variation is most marked when it comes to the allocation of financial assets across different products. Table 1 shows estimates of the aggregate value of gross financial assets ultimately owned by the household sector in the major economies at the end of 1995. This stock of assets includes not only assets held directly by households (for example, bank or building society deposits, cash, direct ownership of bonds and equities) but also assets held on behalf of the personal sector in pension funds (both public and private), insurance companies and collective investment schemes. The table shows that there are significant differences in the ratio of the stock of gross financial assets to annual GDP. The UK, the US and Japan emerge as countries where gross financial assets are large relative to GDP (around threeyears' worth of GDP in each case). In France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Austria and the Netherlands, the gross stock of financial assets is substantially smaller relative to GDP. There is even greater variability in the proportion of financial assets held directly by households and that held on households' behalf by financial intermediaries. In the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and the US, a substantial fraction of the financial assets of the personal sector are held on their behalf by pension funds and insurance companies; in the UK, only about 40 per cent of financial assets are held directly by households. In Italy, Denmark, France, Germany, Austria, Spain and Japan, between 60 and 85 per cent of financial wealth is held directly by households. Table 2 focuses on the allocation of financial assets across different types of asset. What emerges here is that, in those countries where a large part of the financial wealth of the personal sector is channelled through pension funds and insurance companies, a relatively large proportion of the stock of financial wealth ends up in the equity market and, to a smaller extent, in the bond market. In the UK, equities account for over 50 per cent of the total financial assets of the household sector. In Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan, Norway and Denmark, that fraction is well under 20 per cent. Before looking to the future, it is worth making several general points about the numbers in the tables and graphs I have just described. First, the projections on the likely size of deficits on PAYG state pension schemes should not be taken as some kind of proof that unfunded state-run schemes are inherently unworkable. Nor, as Disney (1996) has recently argued, should those projections lead to the inference that ageing, per se, is the cause of problems. The problem for most continental European countries is that the current levels of contributions and of state pension payments are unsustainable and that situation, which has been fairly readily forecastable for several years, has not been made clear to the private sectors in those countries.
Second, there is no overall tendency for savings rates and for the stock of wealth to be significantly lower in those countries where unfunded state pension schemes have been particularly generous. In Italy, France and Germany, the ratio of typical state pensions to average earnings has been substantially higher than in the US and the UK. The savings rates of those countries, and their stock of accumulated wealth, are, however, no lower; indeed, savings rates have been higher. But the allocation of that wealth, particularly of financial assets, is very different. Much more of the financial wealth in those countries is held in the form of liquid assets (primarily bank deposits) which have tended to yield a much lower real return in the long run. Such liquid assets probably represent a more appropriate home for savings that may need to be tapped at short notice. This is no accident; given the relative generosity of provision for retirement, the incentive to accumulate financial assets in a form that is appropriate for long-term savings has been correspondingly lower in those countries.
How portfolio allocations in the major continental European countries may shift in the future will depend heavily on how governments handle the pensions problems that will be generated by demographic change and unsustainably generous benefits. If a single currency becomes widespread in Europe and if the Maastricht Treaty, and in particular the stability pact, mean anything, then European governments will not be able to 'finance' higher pensions expenditure through running substantial deficits over prolonged periods. The scope to fill the funding gap through higher general taxation is also limited. Table 3 shows that in 1996 the ratio of government expenditure to GDP averaged slightly over 50 per cent for European countries. So if European governments had been running balanced budgets in 1996, the ratio of tax revenue to GDP would have needed to have exceeded 50 per cent. The distortions to economic activity generated by rises in tax rates depend upon the base level of taxation on which the increases come.
Economic analysis suggests that tax distortions are non-linear and that an increase in the tax take of GDP of, say, 5 per cent (to fund higher pensions expenditure) has a substantially more damaging effect when the base rate of tax is already 50 per cent than if the base rate were, say, 20 per cent. (In models analysed by Kotlikoff (1996) , tax distortions rise with the square of the effective marginal tax rate.)
In the light of these two points, it seems likely that there will be a significant reduction in the average generosity of state pension schemes in Europe over the next thirty to forty years. This is likely to affect private sector savings and could have a significant impact upon asset prices, which will mean that those countries -Ireland, the UK and the US -whose pension problems are substantially less serious than those of continental European countries will none the less be affected by measures that are necessary in those countries. I want to return to the asset price implications of changes in savings and portfolio allocation generated by demographic change in a moment. Before doing so, I want to consider some of the issues that are generated specifically by the funding problems for PAYG pension schemes. 
III. THE ECONOMICS OF SWITCHING TO FUNDED PENSIONS
One 'answer' to the problem is to switch from unfunded state schemes to funded schemes, either run by the private sector (where people have choices over the management of funds held on their behalf by financial companies) or in the public sector (where contributions to a state scheme are used to build up a fund run by the public sector). There are four potentially large advantages with funded pension schemes over unfunded, PAYG schemes. First, they may generate a higher rate of return on payments made to the scheme than the effective return made on contributions to an unfunded scheme. Second, funded schemes may cause the capital stock to be higher than it otherwise would be. Under certain circumstances (but not always), this may increase economic welfare. Third, a funded scheme may be able to handle demographic changes in an almost automatic way, thereby avoiding the problems of government myopia or of disinclination to take tough decisions on pension levels and contribution rates that are necessary for the long-run sustainability of a PAYG system. Fourth, individuals may view (possibly compulsory) contributions to a fund, the returns on which generate their pension, as being very different from contributions to an unfunded scheme where the link between future benefits and current payments is less clear. Contributions to unfunded schemes are probably viewed as taxes on labour income, so a switch to contributions that are perceived as saving may reduce distortions to labour supply. Feldstein (1996) has argued that these distortions are very large in the US.
The first of these benefits has been well understood by economists since the analysis of Samuelson (1958) almost forty years ago. The inter-generational rate of return on payments into an unfunded scheme is, at a steady-state contribution rate, equal to the sum of labour productivity and the increase in the labour force. In the longer term, this is likely to be close to the increase in real GDP. A funded scheme will generate higher returns to contributions if the rate of return on assets in the fund exceeds this. Table 4 compares the average growth of GDP over the last thirty-five years or so in the major economies with the average real rate of return that would have been earned in those countries on a portfolio that is equally invested in government bonds and domestic equities. For the developed countries as a whole over this period, growth in GDP is somewhat lower than the returns on funds. If the point of comparison is with a portfolio that is two-thirds in equities and only one-third in bonds, the numbers are much more clear cut; in that case, in all countries except Japan (where the return on equity has been unusually low), the rate of return on the portfolio of assets is significantly in excess of average GDP growth. On the face of it, this suggests that the long-run implications of a switch to funded pensions are positive and that the capital stock is beneath the golden rule level (where steady-state per capita consumption is maximised), thereby implying that any increase in national savings is beneficial. (These points completely ignore distributional issues.)
But the idea that a switch from unfunded state-run pension schemes to funded, and possibly privately-run, schemes solves the problem of ageing is misconceived for at least two reasons. First, there is the well-known transitional problem: having a funded scheme may have advantages but getting there is problematic. In a PAYG scheme, the current generation of workers funds pension payments to the current generation of retired. In a funded system, contributions from workers are used to build up a stock of assets. Switching from one scheme to the other means that state pensions to the retired (and those that will be due to existing workers as a result of their past contributions) need to be financed from a source other than workers' contributions. In the case of the Chilean pension reforms, at the transition point, the government issued debt to cover future obligations to existing workers (recognition bonds) and had to pay the retired out of general revenue. The Chilean government was running a substantial surplus (of 5 per cent of GDP) at the time of the privatisation in 1981. It was also the case that state retirement benefits were relatively low and that a military dictatorship was in power in the transition. None of these things is likely to be true in Europe or the US, so the transition problem is more tricky. Even in Chile, the scale of the problem was significant. By 1985, the government was running a budget deficit of 3 per cent of GDP.
In fact, in the simple case of an economy in a steady state, the strategy of issuing government debt to cover existing pension obligations that can no longer be financed through a PAYG pension scheme is self-defeating if the return that needs to be offered on that debt is equal to the return on assets that are built up by current workers. In that case, future tax increases to pay off the debt will wipe out the benefit of the existence of a fund of assets whose return exceeds GDP growth. So, however high the rate of return is, there will be no benefit from switching from a PAYG scheme to a funded scheme. Of course, so long as the funds of the pension schemes are substantially invested in equity and so long as the equity premium (the excess return on equity over bonds) remains significant, there is the scope to go through the transition period with no losers and long-term gainers. But there is then the issue of whether a fund with a very high proportion of assets in equities generates a risk-adjusted return that exceeds the cost of debt. This leads on to a whole host of questions about the risk characteristics of pension payments that depend on the value of investments relative to the risk of unfunded pensions. The usual question here is whether the real returns on a fund are more volatile than the returns earned over a life cycle on contributions to a PAYG scheme. My own feeling is that, on recent evidence, returns from PAYG schemes are at least as risky as returns on a diversified portfolio; one needs only to look at the unanticipated changes to the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) system in the UK to see the scope for huge and hard-to-predict changes in the rate of return earned on contributions to unfunded schemes. More generally, whole generations of workers in Europe may face rates of return on their contributions to PAYG state schemes which, by the middle of the next century, will have turned out to be dramatically lower than history would have led them to expect.
The transition issues in moving from an unfunded to a funded pension system are widely recognised; and the question as to the overall volatility in returns from PAYG against funded schemes is often posed. But there is a profound issue to do with risk and risk-sharing that is very relevant to the choice between funded and unfunded systems but which has been largely ignored. In a world with a complete set of financial markets -that is, one where all forms of wealth can be traded in well-functioning markets -one would expect that the equilibrium portfolio of a representative agent would simply be the market portfolio. That is, the optimal portfolio of wealth for any agent would be a portfolio with asset shares equal to the aggregate shares of different components of wealth in total national worth. Robert Merton's work suggests that this proposition is true in a surprisingly large class of models, and not just in the highly restrictive case where the standard capital asset pricing model holds. (See Merton (1990) .) The overall stock of assets in any economy comprises claims upon physical assets -houses, factories, machines -but also includes the stock of human capital -the current and future value of the labour that can be supplied by people in the economy. The value of human capital is likely to exceed the value of other types of assets substantially. In most economies, earnings and salaries make up well in excess of 50 per cent (and often nearer 80 per cent) of GDP. Thus factor payments going to human capital may be three or four times as large in a typical developed economy as payments going to other factors of production (for example, dividend and bond payments to holders of corporate equity and debt). Now human capital in real economies is not readily tradable; I cannot now sell shares on my future labour income. As Merton has pointed out, the implications of this obvious point are rather profound. In a world where the most important single class of asset is not traded, the portfolio decisions of private agents are substantially restricted (Merton, 1987) .
Let us suppose there is no tradable asset that has close to the same characteristics as a claim upon human capital. Suppose also that people begin their life with no assets other than human capital, spend a period out of the labour force, work for a substantial proportion of their lives and are then retired for a significant proportion of their lives. In this case, the portfolios of assets held over their lives will be significantly different from the portfolio that would be chosen if all assets were tradable. Specifically, in the early and working periods of life, far too much of the portfolio of overall wealth will be in the form of human capital (and non-diversified human capital at that) which cannot be traded (only current hours of work can be sold). In retirement, when human capital is zero, the portfolio of assets will be far too heavily weighted in favour of marketable assets. Merton has shown that, on efficient risk-sharing grounds, this is suboptimal. The key point about all this is that tax-financed state retirement pensions may well represent as close as one can get to a human-capital-type asset. In the absence of a market in human capital, a system whereby the government levies a tax upon the labour income of current workers and uses the proceeds of that tax to finance retirement pensions may help correct the market failure. Such a scheme gives the old a means of acquiring a claim upon human capital -whose returns are uncertain and hard to predict -whilst also effectively reducing the exposure of the working and young to current, temporary shocks to real wages. Dismantling a PAYG state pension scheme would exacerbate the problem of incomplete markets.
Of course, all this would be quite misleading if there were tradable assets that had the characteristics of claims upon human capital. And it might be thought that claims upon corporate capital -that is, equity -had those characteristics. After all, a corporate share is a claim upon some part of the output generated with the help of capital and labour. And if the shares of aggregate income going to capital and labour are constant, then the returns generated by ownership of a share of capital income may track returns to human capital quite closely. But in practice, the returns on corporate capital and the returns on labour look rather different. If we look at the returns on a stock market index in the UK and the returns from using up part of human capital -that is, the returns to currently supplied labour -the correlation is extremely low. The covariance between the monthly, quarterly or annual return on the FTSE All Share index and the monthly, quarterly or annual rate of change of total post-tax wages and salaries paid in the UK is virtually zero.
It is important to be clear about the implication of this observation. It is not that PAYG, state-run pension schemes are superior on risk grounds to funded schemes. Rather, it is that there is some role for state-financed schemes which redistribute money from current workers to the current retired. Merton is very clear on this point. The fact that there are inter-generational, risk-sharing benefits to tax-financed retirement benefits most definitely does not imply that a PAYG scheme should provide all (or even most) of retirement income.
Economists do not yet understand very well the welfare implications of changes in the provision of tax-financed benefits in a world in which there are incomplete financial markets. It may turn out that the absence of a market in human capital is not very important either because some combination of existing assets can mimic a claim on human wealth or just because human capital risk is not very important. Personally, I would be surprised if these things were true. Either way, it is crucial to understand these issues better in order to reach sensible judgements on the desirability of the relative size of state-financed pension systems (and, indeed, other forms of welfare provision).
IV. DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND THE EVOLUTION OF WEALTH, SAVING AND REAL WAGES
There is another area of major uncertainty about the impact of ageing upon the economy and the welfare of its people. This is the macroeconomic impact upon asset prices, the capital stock and real wages of demographic change and of how those changes affect people of different ages. I want to describe to you the results of some simulations on a hugely simplified model of the economy that is designed to throw some light on these difficult issues. I will describe simulations run on a calibrated model of the UK and European economies to assess the impact upon savings, interest rates, wages and the capital stock of demographic changes that are predicted to take place over the next sixty years. The model has many generations alive at any time; the relative numbers of people in different cohorts are adjusted to match United Nations population projections.
The overlapping generations model that I use is of a similar type to that developed by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) . I assume that at any one time there are sixty cohorts of adults alive. Agents of a particular cohort are identical and each has an adult life that lasts 60 years (which we might think of as lasting from late teens to late 70s). Each agent supplies one unit of labour inelastically each year for a working life that lasts for 42 years -thus we set retirement at an age in the early 60s, which in the UK roughly matches the current weighted average state retirement age of males and females.
Agents maximise a utility function that depends only upon the discounted value of the utility they receive from consumption in each period of their lives; this is a 'pure' life-cycle model and there are no bequests. I assume agents have a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution which in a world of certainty implies that consumption increases from period to period at a rate that is proportional to the difference between the real rate of return on saving and the rate of discount of future utility. Agents face a budget constraint that makes the present discounted value of consumption and labour income equal.
As a result of the uneven pattern of labour income over life, agents will choose to save during much of their working life and dissave in retirement. The pattern of labour income reflects several factors, two of which are exogenous: first, the working life is fixed at 42 years and agents have a period in retirement of 18 years. (With a retirement age in the early 60s, this implies life expectancy of about 80. This is higher than current life expectancy at birth in Europe but not much above average male and female life expectancy conditional on reaching working age.) Furthermore, the number of units of effective labour that an agent supplies moves over time exogenously. This exogenous profile of effective labour units supplied reflects, in turn, two factors. First, I assume that there is labouraugmenting technical progress that increases the number of units of effective labour supplied by workers of all ages at a constant rate per period. In the UK version of the model, we set this economy-wide productivity growth at 2 per cent a year -roughly equal to the overall annual average rise in output per head over the past forty years. I set the Europe-wide rate at a slightly higher level to reflect historical higher average labour productivity growth. There is a second, agespecific, form of productivity growth which reflects an agent's changing productivity over his or her life cycle. I will use information on the age-wage relation to generate an age-related productivity factor for all working cohorts.
Labour income for a particular cohort is the product of the number of units of effective labour supplied and the real wage per unit. The latter is endogenous and depends on the aggregate capital to labour ratio which, via a Cobb-Douglas production function, determines the marginal productivity of labour.
How the model is solved depends crucially on whether we assume that the interest rate is exogenous (the small, open economy version) or that it is determined by the domestic capital stock -which in the closed economy version equals the sum of the stocks of wealth of all cohorts alive at each point in time. In the open economy version with an exogenous (and, for simplicity, a constant) real interest rate, it is fairly easy to solve the model. The aggregate capital to (effective) labour ratio used in production is constant and determined by the world interest rate. There is no equality between the domestic demand for wealth and the capital stock used in domestic production. The difference between the two is net claims on the rest of the world. The level of wealth at any point is simply the sum of the net wealths of each generation. In any period, the net wealth of each generation is different depending on where they are in the life cycle. Wealth for a cohort is a function of the profile of labour income over its life, the path of optimal consumption and the interest rate. Optimal consumption is fairly easy to calculate, given known productivity growth, constant interest rates and known working and total lives. Clearly, the degree of saving and wealth is heavily dependent on the time path of income over life and the interest rate. Total wealth and aggregate saving are dependent on the relative numbers of people at different ages as well as upon the assumed paths of both age-related and time-related productivity growth.
I simulate the effects of demographic change in the open economy version of the model as follows: first, I choose the parameters of the model to fit various pieces of macro-and micro-evidence; second, I allow the demographic structure to change year by year and calculate the savings rate, the wealth-income ratio and total domestic wealth at each point.
Notice again that in the open economy version, any extra saving or lower saving generated by demographic shifts will generally cause changes in net claims on the rest of the world which obviously affect national income; but real wages are determined by the growth in labour productivity and the exogenously given movements in the capital-labour ratio required to keep the marginal productivity of capital equal to the world interest rate.
The closed economy version of the model is very much harder to solve because both the rate of interest and the wage rate now move over time as the demographic structure of the economy evolves. I solve the model by an iterative procedure. On the first iteration, I assume a fixed interest rate and also assume that agents expect their future labour income to grow at rates only depending on the age-related and time-related components of productivity growth. I then solve the model as above but now let the capital stock used in production come solely from domestic wealth holdings. This generates a path for the capital-labour ratio that allows us to generate a time profile for the interest rate and for the marginal productivity of labour. In the second iteration, agents re-compute optimal consumption and saving over their lives assuming that they know this new path of future interest rates and wage levels. This generates a new path for the capital-labour ratio and a second set of profiles for interest rates and for wage rates. The iterations are repeated until a fixed point is reached.
What makes this procedure tricky to implement is that we have to keep track of who was born when; because interest rates and capital-labour ratios will move over time, the optimal lifetime consumption and savings profiles will look different for cohorts born at different times. Thus for simulations we have both changes in the relative numbers of people of different ages and differences across generations not just in the levels of lifetime resources but also in the age profiles of savings rates.
Precise details of the structure of the model and a description of how the key parameters were determined are presented in Miles (1997) . Here I just note that the model was calibrated to match known features of real economies: growth rates of real wages, real returns on wealth, factor shares in income, earnings profiles over the working life, aggregate wealth income ratios and private sector savings rates.
The parameters generate the pattern of income over a typical working life Figure 7 . The life-cycle pattern of savings rates is shown in Figure 8 and the evolution of wealth over time in Figure 9 .
I now describe three sets of simulations. First, I look at the open economy version of the UK model, where shifts in domestic wealth have no impact upon real rates of return, and trace the evolution of the savings rate and the wealthincome ratio based on demographic projections to 2050. I then solve a closed economy version of the UK model with feedbacks from saving to rates of return and to the capital-labour ratio in production. Finally, I use the demographic projections for the four largest European economies (Germany, France, Italy and the UK) to simulate a closed economy 'European' version of the model. Figure 10 shows the evolution of the savings rate in the open economy version of the model calibrated to match UK data and where we let the demographic structure follow United Nations population projections. The savings rate takes a roller-coaster ride. In the period until 2006, the rate rises from a 1995 level of 17.8 per cent to just over 19 per cent. By 2013, the rate is back to its 1995 level. Thereafter, the savings rate falls steadily until 2040. By 2036, it is down to 10 per cent. The savings rate hits a low point of 9.3 per cent in 2041, a time at which the proportion of the population aged over 65 is forecast to peak at just over 23 per cent. By 2050, there is predicted to have been a marginal reduction in the number of over-65s and the savings rate moves back up to 9.7 per cent; this is still little more than half the recent average. Although the savings rate ultimately falls sharply, the wealth to income ratio rises steadily. This is solely due to demographic change; if the population structure were unchanging, the wealth-income ratio would be constant in this model. What drives the wealth-income ratio up is the same factor that ultimately drives the savings rate down -a sharp rise in the number of over-65s. This group has both a low savings rate (which is negative) and, on average, a high ratio of wealth to income.
UK Simulations
Such dramatic changes in aggregate savings rates make it important to consider how projections might vary in the closed economy version of the model. I ran the model allowing the capital-labour ratio in production to change over time as both wealth and the size of the labour force evolve; movements in the capital-labour ratio then determine how the real interest rate evolves. As noted above, I solve the model under a perfect foresight assumption that agents calculate optimal consumption and saving taking into account the actual future evolution of interest rates and wages that their collective decisions imply. Figure 12 shows the path taken by the aggregate capital-labour ratio as a result of demographic change. Despite lower saving, the capital-labour ratio rises fairly steadily. The decline in the working population ( Figure 13 ) is sufficiently fast to cause a gradual rise in capital per worker despite lower saving. This causes a gradual, and fairly small, fall in the real interest rate as the marginal return to capital declines slightly. Figure 14 shows that the real interest rate falls by about 40 basis points in the period from 1995 to 2025 before stabilising at a level of just under 3.5 per cent. The fall in the labour force is enough to reduce the growth in per capita (rather than per worker) GDP over the simulation period. By 2050, the level of per capita GDP is about 7 per cent lower than it would be in the absence of demographic change. But real wages are about 3 per cent higher by 2030 than they otherwise would be; the message here is an important one -people born now may lose out from less generous state pensions but capital per worker, and therefore real wages, may be higher when they are working.
European Simulations
For the Europe simulations, I used projections of the demographic structure of Germany, France, Italy and the UK. I call these 'European' simulations because the evolution of the demographic structure of this bloc of countries is similar to that of western Europe as a whole. It is probably inappropriate to make small open economy assumptions for these simulations and I only report results where the interest rate and capital per worker are endogenous. (Demographic changes in North America and in Japan are likely to be qualitatively similar to the changes in Europe, so the closed economy assumption for Europe is reasonable; to make the point in another way, the option of borrowing or lending at world rates of interest that are not subject to the influence of ageing is most unlikely to exist.) In the perfect foresight equilibrium, the parameters of the model, combined with the 1995 demographic structure, generate a wealth-income ratio of 5.8, a savings rate of just under 20 per cent and a real interest rate of 4 per cent (given a share of profits in GDP of just under 25 per cent). The average private sector savings rate for the period 1990-95 for these countries was around 20 per cent and OECD estimates of the ratio of national net wealth to income are a bit over 5.5. With these simulations, the savings rate declines by substantially more than was the case for the UK; this reflects the greater rise in the ratio of the retired to the working population in Germany, France and, especially, Italy. The wealth to income ratio and the ratio of capital to labour both rise over the simulation period ( Figure 15 ). As in the UK closed economy simulation, the interest rate ultimately declines to a level of about 3.5 per cent (Figure 16 ).
I think highly simplified models such as the one I have just described have some uses: for example, the observation that, in the long run, lower savings need not imply higher interest rates because the labour force declines by more than the capital stock (so that the capital-labour ratio is rising) is a useful one. And the implications this has for real wages of workers thirty years from now are • perfect foresight;
• no credit restrictions;
• no uncertainty about changes in taxation or in the provision of state pensions;
• a highly simplified financial sector where there is effectively only one asset which generates real returns whose future path can be worked out; • no variability in personal circumstances of agents of the same age;
• simple life-cycle behaviour where agents do not care about the welfare of their children or their parents and where there are no bequests.
Simply listing this formidable range of assumptions is enough to make one very wary about drawing strong conclusions. The way forward, I think, is to try to develop models that take seriously heterogeneity across agents, uncertainty about future labour incomes and returns on different categories of assets, credit restrictions and concerns about the welfare of others. This is a difficult enterprise but one where substantial advances have been made in the last few years. The work of Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) in the analysis of the impact of welfare systems in the US is a good example of how economic theory can be combined with powerful computing techniques and careful analysis of data to generate important insights into the operation of markets. Similar work is under way at the Institute for Fiscal Studies in the UK. This kind of research is difficult and time-consuming; it is also essential if we are to understand the likely impacts 
V. CONCLUSIONS
There are two conclusions I want to draw. First, there may well be substantial swings in private savings rates over the next fifty years -saving may be higher for a significant period but in the longer term is likely to fall well below recent levels as the proportion of the population aged over 65 rises to levels never before seen. But the impact of this upon rates of return on capital may be relatively muted because a lower savings rate (which, other things equal, would lower the path of the capital-labour ratio) is likely to be offset by a smaller work-force (which obviously works in the opposite direction). In the European simulations, the savings rate is less than half its recent level by 2030 while the real interest rate falls by 50 basis points (from just over 4 per cent to just over 3.5 per cent), a proportionate decline of only 12.5 per cent. What impact declining equilibrium rates of return have upon the wealth and welfare of different generations is a fascinating issue but one that the highly simplified model used here is not particularly well suited to address. In this model, the value of a unit of capital in terms of consumer goods is fixed at unity and there is no revaluation of the stock of wealth as interest rates move. In practice, a substantial part of the wealth of older generations is in fixed income assets (government bonds are by far the most significant asset for pension schemes in most European countries). To the extent that falls in interest rates generated by demographic change are not fully anticipated, they will generate capital gains to bondholders. This boost to some asset prices is helpful to those running down assets; but lower rates of return clearly reduce the flow of ongoing income from wealth, which is more important for younger households who may still be accumulating assets. The key point here is that there is a distinction between capital gains on existing assets from the capitalisation of future income streams at lower discount rates (which helps those with large stocks of such assets) and a fall in the return on marginal increments to the stock of assets -a factor that clearly does not help younger households with relatively low wealth-income ratios and for whom future saving is substantial. The distributional aspects of asset price changes are clearly worth investigating further and require a model with a richer set of assets.
The second conclusion I want to draw is that unfunded state pension schemes may have an important role to play in a world of incomplete financial markets and where inter-generational risk-sharing can be welfare-enhancing. Richard Crossman said, cruelly, just after Hugh Gaitskell had died that 'where there is death there is hope'. It is useful to remember that so long as there is death there is also always the scope to run a sustainable, unfunded pension scheme.
